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Abstract
Realizing sustainable development is a major challenge for most African countries.
Economic growth in most African countries is largely centered on the extraction of natural
resources, particularly minerals. Rather than facilitate development, the extraction of
natural resources in most countries, has been a source of adverse outcomes. That is, natural
resources led to ‘the resource curse’, partly because of bad governance and leadership.
Through governance and leadership, Botswana emerged differently. The country
transformed itself to a middle income status through the prudent utilization and
management of mineral (non-renewable) resources; making Botswana one of the few
resource rich countries that have so far avoided the blight of the ‘the resource curse’. Yet,
the sole reliance on one non-renewable resource is risky as evidenced by the recent global
financial crisis. Sustainable development necessitates greater emphasis on renewable
resources whose utilization and management require a different strategy to drive
development forward. The paper identifies governance and leadership amongst the central
tenets to Botswana’s development success story. It argues that, for the last four decades its
governance and leadership strategy served the country well, given the context of the time.
Going forward, an enhanced governance and leadership strategy is necessary to
successfully exploit and manage the country’s resources for the benefit of all. To this
extent, the paper concludes that other African countries need to consider and review their
governance structures in order to realize sustainable development.
Keywords: Natural resources, governance, leadership and sustainable development

Introduction
Governance is acknowledged internationally by policy makers, aid agencies and
institutions, including the World Bank, as a major policy imperative to facilitate sustainable
development – albeit contested. Utilizing Hyden, Court and Mease’s (2004) conceptualization of
governance, and as built on by Robert Rotberg (2005), this paper seeks to demonstrate that,
undeniably governance is critical to the success of any country’s development prospects. Hyden,
Court and Mease (2004,16) defined governance as “the formation and stewardship of the formal
and, informal rules that regulate the public realm, the area in which state as well as economic and
societal actors interact to make decisions”.
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For Rotberg (2004, 71), governance entails “the tension-filled interaction between citizens
and their rulers and the various means by which governments can either help or hinder their
constituents’ ability to achieve satisfaction and material prosperity”. When governance is
measured in terms of the quality of delivery of goods, both in quality and quantity, as Rotberg
(2004) asserts, the majority of African countries are far and/or struggling to realize this goal.
The concept of governance and its effect on policy discourse has been evolving since the
market liberalization reforms of the 1980s (Kwame Sundaram and Chowdhury, 2012). However,
it was not until in the 1990s that it was embraced as a major international policy consideration
(Sebudubudu, 2010; Kwame Sundaram and Chowdhury, 2012). In turn, governance has become a
critical theme for several conferences internationally in an attempt to encourage and nurture it.
Consequently, the World Bank introduced its Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGIs) research
project that entails six elements of; voice and accountability, political stability and absence of
violence/terrorism, government effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of law, and control of
corruption (Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi 2009:2). However, research; even from within the
Bank itself, have criticized WGIs for their conceptual and methodological flaws (Kwame
Sundaram and Chowdhury, 2012). Despite its flaws, governance has become a standard
requirement to qualify for donor assistance or loans and/or grants from financial institutions. Even
then Rotberg (2004, 72) warns us that “tying donor assistance to good governance conditionality
may help at the margin”.
The effects of bad governance are more evident in Africa – where life is depressing and
unbearable for the majority of people. Understandably, the absence of good governance retards
economic development and delivery of goods to the majority of people. Deplorably, most African
countries have failed to realise development despite an abundance of resources, mainly because of
bad governance. This shows that resource endowment does not automatically translate into
development. Take for instance a number of African countries such as Angola, the Democratic
Republic of Congo (DRC) and Nigeria. The Economist considers Angola “one of sub-Saharan
Africa's richest countries”. Not only is it regarded as the fifth producer of diamonds in the world
but “its oil wells … produce 1.9m barrels a day; on present trends, it could overtake Nigeria to
become Africa's largest producer. It [also] has huge agricultural potential” (2011,
http://www.economist.com; accessed 16 June 2014). Despite its wealth, “Only 9% of Luanda's
population of 5m has running water, a lower share than during the civil war. Across Angola, half
the population of 18m has virtually no access to health care. The country has one of the world's
highest rates of infant mortality, and the only known cases of urban polio” (2011,
http://www.economist.com; accessed 16 June 2014). Nigeria is another country that is equally
rich in Africa yet its poverty levels remain alarmingly high. Despite being one of the major
producers of oil in Africa, and in the world, the number of people living in poverty in Nigeria was
put at 112.47 million in 2010, up from 17.1 million in 1980 (BBC news Africa, 2012;
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-17015873; accessed 16th June 2014). The Democratic
Republic of the Congo (DRC) is similarly rich in natural resources yet the country “hardly [has]
any roads or railways, while the health and education systems lie in ruins”, which is a clear
indication that “its resource wealth has rarely been harnessed for [its people’s] benefit” (BBC news
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Africa, 2012; http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-11108589, accessed 16 June 2014). There
are many such countries in Africa, which are rich in natural resources, yet poor largely because of
bad governance. However, one thing is certain about the three African countries cited above. The
level of deprivation has nothing to do with shortage of economic resources to drive development,
suggesting that resource endowment has been a curse in those countries. These are clear examples
of African countries that have been poorly governed. Nevertheless, there are countries in Africa
that emerged differently, and Botswana is one such a country, which is the focus of this paper. The
paper, first uses the case of Botswana to show how governance of land and natural resources
assisted it to evade the resource curse - suggesting that indeed governance makes a difference to a
country’s development prospects. Second, it seeks to show how the country can use renewable
resources (agriculture and tourism) to achieve sustainable development. As shown with the mineral
sector, we contend that governance is even critical for renewable resources to realize their full
potential in terms of their contribution to sustainable development. It is the case of Botswana that
we now turn to.
Governance of Land and Natural Resources for Sustainable Development:
The Botswana Context
The story of Botswana’s democratic developmental achievements seems like a fairy tale but this is real. To some, it is like a puzzle that analysts have been trying to understand and explain
over the years. Yet, no single satisfactory explanation has been offered for how and why the
country transformed itself the way it did in the last 48 years of self-rule. At independence,
Botswana was considered as a hopeless case that had “dismal economic prospects … based on
vague hopes of agriculture, salt and coal” (Beattie 2009, 115 quoting a British Government Report
on Botswana’s future in 1960). Both social and economic indicators pointed in that direction, and
these have been well documented in the literature. For instance, the literacy rate stood at 25%, per
capita income was around U$ 80 while life expectancy was put at 48 (Sebudubudu and Molutsi,
2011). There was virtually no physical infrastructure as well. Masire (2006) notes that there were
‘only eight kilometres’ of tarred road, and Beattie (2009) at the most put them at ‘12 kilometres’.
Faced with all these, the country had to make the critical decisions at the material time. As Masire
(2006, 168) observed, “it was clear from the very beginning that if we were to succeed in raising
the living standard of our people, we would have to find the greatest amount of financial resources
possible, invest them to achieve a high rate of economic growth, and create productive
employment opportunities.”Indeed, Botswana’s leaders lived to their pledges by making the
critical decisions and ensuring that the country was not misgoverned. 48 years later, the
Botswana’s story is different.
While most African countries went on a path of bad governance and self-destruction (i.e.
Angola, Nigeria, Sudan, The Democratic Republic of the Congo, Sierra Leone and many others),
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Botswana is one of a few countries that “through fiscal discipline and sound management”
used its resources, particularly its diamond wealth, to leap “from being one of the poorest in the
world to a middle-income country with a per capita GDP of $16, 400 in 2013”, and sustained “one
of the world’s highest economic growth rates since independence in 1966” (The World Fact book,
2014; https://www.cia.gov; accessed 23 June 2013).
The direction taken by Botswana’s leaders regarding how to utilize the resource rents from
diamonds was to reinvest them in reproducible capital, as underpinned by Hartwick’s rule (1977).
Essentially, Government took resource revenues from diamond and reinvested them in
reproducible capital (buildings, roads, knowledge stocks, etc.); thus, offsetting the declining stocks
of non-renewable resources. By so doing, the overall standard of living did not fall as society
progressed. In fact, as can be seen from Figures 1 and 2 below, as growth performance improved
poverty declined. From 46.1% in 1985/86, poverty dropped to about 20% in 2009/10 (Statistics
Botswana, 2011), in part due to the prudent use of mineral revenues.
Figure 1: Botswana Real GDP Growth
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As Sebudubudu and Molutsi (2011,10) aptly pointed out , “assessing Botswana on the basis
of the core indicators of health (reduced mortality), education (basic literacy rate) and economic
performance (increased per capita income), good leadership has enabled the country to record
impressive achievements”. Moreover, the country “also used its mineral wealth to improve
infrastructure so that there now exists some 10 000 km of paved road…” (Sebudubudu and Molutsi
2011, 10).
International indicators also suggest that Botswana has been successful in a number of
measures. For instance, the World Bank Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGIs) project
percentile rankings for Botswana in the period 1996 – 2012 (as shown in Table 1 below) indicate
that the country has consistently performed well in the six governance dimensions of; voice and
accountability, political stability, government effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of law and
control of corruption. Save for voice and accountability that has experienced a decline between
2005 and 2011, the country has maintained stable and high percentile rankings in the other five
dimensions – suggesting good performance on the quality of its governance.
Table 1: Botswana Governance ranking: 1996-2012
Year
Voice &
Political
Government
accountability stability
Effectiveness
1996
74.52
77
68
1998
70.19
77
71
2000
66.83
79
71
2002
67.79
73
73
2003
68.27
86
75
2004
72.6
77
73
2005
65.87
84
72
2006
61.54
80
70
2007
61.06
82
73
2008
61.54
81
70
2009
59.24
83
68
2010
61.14
82
67
2011
59.62
83
67
2012
64
89
67

Regulatory
Quality
75
74
72
75
75
72
70
66
65
65
66
67
69
74

Rule of
law
63
68.42
64.59
64.59
71.29
69.86
67.46
67.46
67.94
70.19
68.25
68.72
69.95
70

Control of
Corruption
75
78
75
75
86
80
83
78
79
80
79
80
80
79

Source: Kaufmann, D., Kraay, A and Mastruzzi, M, 2013 Update World Governance indicators

For comparison, Table 2 below shows the World Bank WGIs percentile rankings for selected
African countries in the Southern African Development Community (SADC) region including
Botswana, and countries outside the region such as India, China and the United States of America
(USA) for 2011 and 2012. Undoubtedly, Botswana has scored high percentiles when compared to
its peers such as Malawi, South Africa, Zambia and Zimbabwe. Of the selected SADC countries
listed below, Mauritius is the only country that has scored equally high or higher percentiles as
Botswana in some dimensions. Botswana has also outperformed China and India. Interestingly,
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Botswana scored higher percentiles than the USA in the aspect of political stability in 2011 and
2012.
Table 2: Governance Rankings for Selected Countries: 2011 & 2012
Botswana

Zimbabwe

Malawi

Zambia

South Africa

Mauritius

India

China

USA

Country
Year
Voice &
Accountabilit
y
Political
Stability
Government
Effectiveness
Regulatory
Quality

Rule of Law
Control of
Corruption

2011

201
2

2011

2012

2011

2012

2011

2012

2011

2012

2011

2012

2011

2012

6.16

7.11
21.8
0
10.5
3

39.9
1
44.8
1
41.2
3

41.7
1
45.0
2
38.2
8

43.1
9
62.7
4
28.9
1

43.6
0
65.4
0
37.8
0

66.2
0
48.5
8
66.3
5

65.4
0
43.1
3
63.6
4

70.4
2
75.9
4
76.3
0

73.9
3
79.1
5
77.0
3

60.5
6
11.3
2
54.9
8

58.7
7
11.8
5
47.3
7

2.37

2.39

27.0
1

25.8
4

36.4
9

35.8
9

64.4
5

63.1
6

76.7
8

79.4
3

39.8
1

0.94

1.9

3.32

5.26

50.2
3
43.6
0

47.3
9
39.7
1

39.9
1
37.9
1

42.6
5
45.9
3

58.2
2
58.7
7

57.8
2
53.1
1

77.9
3
72.5
1

78.2
0
66.9
9

52.1
1
33.1
8

59.6
2

64

83

89

7.98
19.3
4

67

67

69

74

69.9
5

70

80

79

2011

2012

2011

2012

5.63
27.8
3
59.2
4

4.74
28.4
4
55.9
8

85.4
5
65.5
7
91.0
0

86.2
6
68.2
5
90.4
3

33.9
7

44.0
8

43.5
4

91.4
7

87.5
6

52.6
1
34.9
3

43.6
6
34.6
0

38.8
6
39.2
3

91.0
8
86.2
6

91.4
7
89.4
7

Source: Kaufmann, D., Kraay, A and Mastruzzi, M, 2013 Update World Governance indicators

Other surveys equally suggest that Botswana is performing well. The country has been
rated the least corrupt country in Africa for 18 years by Transparency International Corruption
Perception Index (CPI). The 2013 CPI placed Botswana at position 30 out of 177 countries. In
terms of the Ibrahim Index of African Governance (IIAG) that measures four governance
categories of - safety & rule of law, participation & human rights, sustainable economic
opportunity, and human development - Botswana was also ranked 3rd and 2nd in Africa in 2012
and 2013 respectively. To this extent, the country’s indicators reflect a marked improvement,
unparalleled to many countries in Africa.
It is in this context that Hope (1998, 539) when noting the transformation the country had realised
aptly quipped that “in whichever way measured, or determined, Botswana is one of Africa’s star
performers. [Undoubtedly, the country] is exceptional, both within Africa and among less
developed countries, as a whole, when comparison is made of macro-economic performance,
development management, and good governance”. This paper locates Botswana’s
accomplishments in its governance architecture. At the centre of Botswana’s success is its
governance of land and natural resources, particularly its mineral policy. It is Botswana’s land
management and mineral policies that we now turn to.
Governance of Land and Minerals in Botswana
Botswana’s success is largely anchored on its governance and usage of natural resources –
land and minerals. At independence, land and minerals were identified as ‘strategic resources’
whose ‘ownership and control’ was critical to the country’s development prospects. Historically,
private ownership and subsequent control of land and natural resources is often viewed as the
panacea to averting resource mismanagement or overexploitation (Demstez, 1967; Cheung, 1970;
Posner, 1977; Allen and Barnes 1985). Evidence shows that the privatization of resources is not
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always the antidote for resource overexploitation (Makepe, 2006) This paper, uses evidence from
Botswana to show that the privatization and control of resources is indeed, not a superior solution
to the problem of resource mismanagement or overexploitation. In fact, public ownership and
control of resources when accompanied by good governance can provide an alternative solution to
the problem of land mismanagement and resource overexploitation. Regarding land, a deliberate
effort was made to transfer its ownership mainly from the different tribes and chiefs, and individual
owners to the state (Mazonde, 1987; Adams, Kalabamu and White, 2003; Sebudubudu and Molutsi
2011). As a result, two major policies were introduced - the Tribal Land Act of 1968 and the Tribal
Grazing Land Policy (TGLP) of 1975 that “succeeded in taking/reducing the chief’s control of
tribal land and establishing individual control of large ranches of tribal land” (Sebudubudu and
Molutsi 2011, 24). The Tribal Land Act established “the land board as the custodian of tribal land
allocation, administration and recipient of any revenue from such land by its private users”
(Sebudubudu and Molutsi 2011, 24), marking a departure from the chiefs land allocation era. And
as Masire (2006, 184) puts it, this was “part of our effort to remove the arbitrary power of the
chiefs, we needed to create a new system for allocation of land”. However, some scholars (Baland
et al, 1996; Poteete, 1999 and Makepe, 2006) have argued that the transference of land allocation
from the chiefs may have led to the delegitimisation of traditional institutions for land management
and impacted negatively on communal range land management. With regard to the TGLP, it was
flawed because it allowed ranch owners with large herds to graze their cattle within and without
ranches increasing grazing pressure on the remaining communal land.
At independence, ownership of the three types of land was put at 48.8% tribal land
(formerly tribal reserves), 47.4% state land (formerly crown land) and 3.7% freehold land (Adams,
Kalabamu and White, 2003). Although the country held on to its three types of land, “the
government has since independence adopted a policy not to increase freehold tenure.
Tribal land has progressively increased from 49% to 71%, through conversion of state and
freehold land” (Mothibi, Malatsi and Finnström, n. d). Consequently, ownership of land rights is
put at 71% tribal land, 25% state land and 4% freehold land (Adams, Kalabamu and White, 2003;
Mothibi, Malatsi and Finnström, n. d). The effect of this policy is that, in the main, it centralised
land rights as a resource under the control of the state. It is in this context that Adams, Kalabamu
and White (2003,1) observed that Botswana “has developed a robust land administration, which
has greatly contributed to good governance and economic progress. Its land tenure policy has been
described as one of careful change, responding to particular needs with specific tenure
innovations”. To this extent they noted that “its approach is of interest because it is finding
solutions to problems that continue to elude its neighbours”.
A related policy was made with respect to ownership of mineral rights by the state through
the Mines and Minerals Act of 1967. As Masire (2006, 200-201) noted “even before we understood
our potential mineral wealth, we knew that vesting minerals rights in the state would be critical for
both our overall economic development and our political unity and stability”. This, he declares
was “with full consultation of the people” (Masire 2006, 199). The transfer of mineral rights from
the different tribes to the state was possible in part because the first minerals were found in an area
controlled by the Bangwato tribe, Seretse Khama’s tribe. To this extent, Seretse Khama was
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instrumental in ensuring that mineral rights were entrusted on the state (Masire, 2006; Sebudubudu
and Molutsi, 2011). This is supported by Sebudubudu and Molutsi (2011,27) who retorted that
“the new elites that assumed office at independence, particularly under the leadership of Seretse
Khama, played a crucial role in ensuring that mineral rights were ceded from the different ethnic
groupings to the central government, following an extended consultation process with the different
ethnic groups. This was made easy because the first minerals were discovered in the Bangwato
area, the birthplace of Seretse Khama”. This policy of entrusting minerals rights on the state has
been lauded and is often regarded to be at the heart of prudent mineral utilization in Botswana as
it ensured that minerals benefited the whole nation as opposed to sectional interests where the
minerals were found. To some extent Botswana was lucky because her diamonds are buried
underground requiring technical expertise and know how to extract them. This also made it easy
to control and manage them. In contrast, in other countries such as Sierra Leone, diamonds are
readily found above the ground making them more difficult to control and manage.
In addition to this policy, the government entered “into a strategic partnership with
international capital. De Beers, in particular, became a critical partner forming a uniquely
successful coalition [called DEBSWANA] that mined and managed sales and shared revenues in
such a way that it has benefited the country’s development programme in a sustainable way”
(Sebudubudu and Molutsi 2011,27). This partnership was necessary because at the time Botswana
did not have the expertise to exploit the diamonds by herself. She then accepted and entered into
a partnership with De Beers with 15% (Botswana government) and 85% (De Beers) which she
later renegotiated to 50 -50 partnership for 25 years.
It is this unique partnership and indeed how the proceeds were used that came to define
modern Botswana, with minerals playing a central role in its development and transformation,
from being a poor to a middle income country.
As time went on and the country developed, it was realised that the country was missing
out on the potential that existed for vertical diversification or beneficiation of the diamond
industry. Eventually when the contract with De Beers was drawing to a close the country’s leaders
and policy makers saw the opportunity to renegotiate the contract with De Beers so that a new
contract could be signed that would facilitate the beneficiation of the diamond industry.
According to Mbayi (2013, 25), Botswana’s real opportunity came in 2005 when DeBeers’
25 year mining license was due for renewal. The government had a lot of bargaining power due to
the significance of Debswana’s production in De Beers’ global production. In 2005, Botswana
accounted for about 60% of De Beers’ supply of rough diamonds (Even-Zohar, 2007, 46). The
government insisted that in order for De Beers to renew its mining license for another 25 years it
should help Botswana in creating a viable cutting and polishing industry. De Beers gave in to the
government's demands and signed the new mining contract under the following conditions: (1) a
renewal of the mining licenses for Debswana for 25 years, (2) the sale of Debswana’s production
to the Diamond Trading Company (DTC) International for another five years; and (3) the
establishment of DTC Botswana (De Beers, 2007).
This is an excellent example of the good governance and strategic thinking of Botswana’s
leadership because the contract that was renegotiated and eventually signed resulted in the
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formation of the Diamond Trading Company Botswana (DTCB). This company comprises 50%
ownership by both parties. In addition, Botswana has 15% share ownership of De Beers with an
option to buy up to 25% (Mbayi, 2013). However, when the shares were up for sale Botswana
opted not to increase her shareholding in De Beers to 25% because she was risk averse coupled
with the fact that she would still remain a minority shareholder. The ingenuity of this arrangement
is that it strengthened Botswana’s negotiation position within the De Beers Group. The ownership
arrangement in De Beers has since changed to 15% share ownership by Botswana and 85% by
Anglo America.
As a result of the new contractual arrangement, in 2013 Diamond Trading Company
International (DTCI) was successfully relocated to Gaborone from London, and sells and markets
rough diamonds locally. This has promoted local citizen participation and empowerment through
employment creation and active participation in the running of companies which buy rough
diamonds from the DTCB. About 27 companies have been given licenses by the government of
Botswana to do diamond cutting and polishing activities locally. As a result, the government
reported growth that the diamond cutting and polishing sector created 3651 jobs in 2013 (Republic
of Botswana, 2013). Beneficiation of diamonds in Botswana is also seen as a major transfer of
skills.
Diversifying the economy away from minerals is critical because the sole reliance on one
non-renewable resource is risky as evidenced during the recent global financial crisis. This
suggests that the country needs to review its strategy by investing in renewable resources for it to
realize sustainable development. Sustainable development necessitates greater emphasis on
renewable resources whose utilization and management require a different strategy to drive
development forward. It is the utilization and management of renewable resources in Botswana
that we turn to.
Governance of Renewable Resource Based Sectors for Economic Diversification
In this section of the paper, the focus is on renewable resources based sectors. With
diamonds, the country was able to reduce poverty levels to just below 21% (Statistics Botswana,
2011). Despite its achievements, the country is still grappling with challenges of inequality with a
high Gini coefficient of 0.65, national poverty and unemployment rate of 20.7% and 17.8% in
2009/10 respectively (BCWIS, 2011). This is largely because the mineral sector is not inclusive
although it is a major contributor to the GDP growth. Thus the drive towards economic
diversification necessitates a search for a strategy that can result in the successful harnessing of
renewable resource based sectors for the benefit of all.
The proper management of the utilization of renewable resources is critical for sustainable
development. Although these resources are renewable and can therefore regenerate themselves,
they possess unique characteristics15 which if ignored could lead to their overuse and eventual
depletion. In the same vein, if such resources are underutilised opportunities for development are
15

For example, access to livestock on communal rangelands in Botswana is free and unrestricted (open access) and
if not properly managed can lead to overstocking, overgrazing and subsequently desertification.
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missed. Such outcomes are detrimental to sustainability and the very livelihoods of the people who
are directly dependent on these resources for survival. It is well known and widely accepted that
the poor are directly dependent on renewable resources, for their survival. In many cases they
reside in rural areas where day to day life is directly linked to the environment. Yet, with rural to
urban migration this is increasingly becoming true of urban areas. Therefore, the environment is
inextricably linked to and underpins goals to reduce poverty and promote economic growth and
diversification.
Given the above, the challenge then becomes what in terms of governance can be
transferred from Botswana’s diamond success story to the renewable resource based sectors so
that the utilization of the country’s renewable resources can be successfully managed for the
benefit of all. The two renewable resource based sectors we focus on are agriculture and tourism
because of their importance to the Botswana economy. Figure 3 below, shows agriculture and
tourism’s contribution to GDP. During the global financial crisis of 2008/09, the risk of
Botswana’s reliance on mining was evident. Consequently, agriculture and tourism, as shown in
Figure 3 below, emerged as the main drivers of the economy during the crisis and possibly beyond.
These are the very sectors that we argue have a potential to assist in the diversification and
sustainable development of Botswana since they are labour intensive and thus inclusive.
Figure 3: Agriculture and Tourism Contribution to GDP

Source: Bank of Botswana Annual Report (2013)

Within agriculture we focus on the governance of the beef value chain, and in tourism on
Community Based Tourism (CBT) facilitated through the Community Based Natural Resource
Management (CBNRM) programme. What has been achieved and what needs to be done to
improve the performance of these sectors in a way that is inclusive?
Agriculture: The Botswana Beef Value Chain
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Botswana has a national cattle herd of about three million (CSO, 2006). About 80% of
which are held by people owning up to 20 cattle reared extensively on communal land, where
access to grazing is free and unrestricted (Makepe, 2006; Marumo et al, 2009). These small herders
are also the main sellers of cattle to the Botswana Meat Commission (BMC). Therefore, they
benefit the most from having the option to sell to the BMC, in addition to the other smaller less
lucrative outlets on the domestic market.
About half of the country’s population resides in the rural areas where they rely primarily
on agriculture for their livelihood (CSO, 2011). In fact, in 1966 traditional cattle farming was the
dominant and highest contributor to (Agriculture’s contribution to GDP) AgGDP, total exports
and employment (Marumo et al, 2009). This suggests the beef value chain and its proper
governance are critical to Botswana. Further, the benefits from investing in agriculture are felt in
the long term compared to those from diamonds which are more immediate. Investing is
agriculture is a long, steady and painful process requiring patience, good and strong leadership
because the benefits from such investment are felt in the long term. Consequently, good
governance and strong leadership are vital to transform the beef value chain and make it more
competitive in lucrative export markets. More than 80% of the beef produced is exported through
the Botswana Meat Commission (BMC) which has the sole monopoly on beef exports (Fidzani et
al, 1997, Marumo et al, 2009). As one of the African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) countries,
Botswana has benefited from access to the lucrative European Union (EU) market, with a
quota of 18 916 tonnes; first under the Lome Convention followed by the Cotonou agreement and
lately under the Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA) with the EU. However, the EU EPA was
drawing to a close (in October 2014) at the time of writing. Notably, Botswana has not been able
to meet its quota due to supply bottlenecks (Makepe, 1996) and less than favourable governance
of the complex beef value chain (van Engelen et al, 2013). Failure to meet the quota represents a
missed opportunity in terms of revenue generation for cattle producers and the country as a
whole.In the last decade, world markets have shifted from being mass produce markets to
differentiated product markets and niche markets for consumers with higher purchasing power.
This has propelled a shift towards sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS) measures to be used as a
strategic tool, rather than a protectionist measure, for developing and differentiating markets,
gaining market access, coordinating the quality and safety of the food system and defining niche
markets for affected products (Reardon et al, 2001). On the demand side, high income consumers
with varied and sophisticated tastes have buttressed this change and on the supply side so have
production, processing and distribution technologies that allow for product differentiation and
market extension and segmentation (Reardon et al, 2001). Consequently, SPS measures have now
become a competitive instrument in differentiated product markets (Reardon et al, 2001). More
often than not, developing countries lament the use of SPS measures by developed countries. The
paper argues that developing countries have no option but to meet the set standards if they are to
compete and benefit from lucrative developed country markets. Meeting these standards also
benefits domestic markets as locals will have access to safe, healthy and better quality products
and jobs as well as learning by doing.
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To this end, the government has invested a lot in terms of ensuring that the Botswana beef
value chain conforms to the requirements of the discerning customer in the EU. For example, in
1997, the EU introduced a directive making it mandatory for all beef exported to the EU to be
identifiable and traceable from farm to plate, through a computerised system. Consequently,
Botswana introduced the livestock identification and traceback system (LITS) in 1999 to meet this
requirement and maintain much needed EU market access (Marumo et al, 2009). While securing
a niche in the EU market has been lucrative, it also has its pitfalls as lack of conformity with SPS
measures can result in an export ban which could have negative consequences for the BMC and
livelihoods of beef producers and their families. Once imposed, not only is revenue lost; there is
also the danger that competitors will move in to take the retail space left vacant, and more
investment will be needed to restore consumer confidence in the product, once the ban is lifted.
For example, in 2011 the Botswana government suspended beef exports to the EU for at least six
months following non-compliance with EU abattoir hygiene and animal traceability standards. As
a result, Botswana farmers lost about 48 million Euros due to the export suspension.
According to van Engelen et al (2013) the governance of the beef value chain refers to the
vertical linkages between players along the value chain that coordinate the activities that bring the
product from farm to plate. Such linkages include spot market transactions over contracts to
vertical integration.
Consequently, governance is about the power and the capability to exert control along the
chain and at any point in the chain and how much of the marketing margin is captured. It also
encompasses the players, institutions, regulations and rules that set the parameters which comprise
the safety and quality standards under which the players operate. Information sharing, learning by
doing, financing and the creation of shared value are a crucial component of governance.
For the Botswana beef value chain, governance must address complex relationships
between buyers, butcheries, other beef processors, sellers (cattle farmers, feedlot operators),
service providers (speculators and agents, veterinary services, abattoirs, input suppliers, banks,
extension services, support programmes) and regulatory institutions such as, the Department of
Veterinary Services (DVS), that influence all the activities needed to bring beef to the final
consumer locally and abroad (van Engelen et al., 2013). The current model, in which the DVS,
farmers and the BMC seem to operate using a “silo mentality”; focusing more on internal
objectives rather than on partnering towards a common goal, is limiting the industry from
achieving its full potential. The Botswana beef value chain is largely producer driven and not
retailer driven.
On the one hand, there are few commercial farmers with economic clout who want to
liberalize and intensify the beef industry and on the other, there are the traditional farmers who
have political clout but prefer the extensive communal grazing system where cattle graze freely on
communal rangelands. Consequently, for Botswana transforming the beef value chain through
upgrading for higher end market segments is constrained when compared to Namibia and South
Africa. The problem with this is that Botswana continues to sell high quality organic meat products
into lower priced domestic markets.

http://scholarworks.wmich.edu/ijad/

93
For the Botswana beef value chain to be economically, socially and environmentally
sustainable, supply chain coordination and integrity from farm to plate is crucial. However, for the
most part this is not happening. Producers generally do not know in advance where and when they
will sell their animals. This is especially the case for the small holder farmers. Even though beef
production is driven by product specifications and suffers from volatile quantities supplied,
farmers are not using forward contracts to produce weaners or oxen. As a result, there are no
contract embedded services available to farmers (e.g. credit to buy inputs such as dry season feed).
Farmers sell when they can and when they want or need to, driven by their personal or
environmental conditions, rather than on the basis of information from buyers. Even within the
BMC, the largest player in the beef value chain, coordination between procurement, processing,
distribution and sales is wanting. Mechanisms for improving vertical coordination are needed. For
example, auctions for the sale of cattle have just become operational (van Engelen et al, 2013).
Just as there is a carefully regulated system for the extraction, buying and selling of
diamonds, Botswana needs to establish a national meat council to coordinate the beef value chain.
Funded through a levy system, such a body could take on the many tasks that would facilitate
smooth value chain operations across various stakeholders. These tasks could include brokering
partnerships, mediation in sales disputes, providing market intelligence, promoting Botswana beef
in export markets and setting product approved standards for the industry that cover the whole
value chain. At present, there is little involvement from farmer cooperatives, syndicates and
associations in the improvement of marketing practices and links with the BMC.
Highly coordinated and strategically designed supply chains in which all stakeholders are
achieving their objectives and are partnering to realize a common goal are necessary if Botswana
wants to establish herself as a credible, reliable supplier of differentiated, healthy and high-quality
beef products. The value embedded in the final product including its social and environmental
attributes are a cumulative outcome of what happens from range management to the retail shelf.
Community-Based Tourism
Botswana is well endowed with flora and fauna which make tourism a major potential
contributor to economic growth. Tourism in the country is mostly wildlife-based, and most of the
national parks are located in the northern part. These include amongst others, the Moremi Game
Reserve and the Chobe National Park.
The other key parks are located in the south western parts of the country. Interestingly, the
Okavango Delta which is also located in the northern part of the country has just been inscribed as
the 1000th site on the World Heritage list. This enhances its attractiveness to tourists around the
world and makes tourism in Botswana one of the best alternatives for diversification and poverty
reduction. Sadly, the highest poverty rates in Botswana are also found in the north-western and
south-western parts of the country where the poverty rate was reported at 46% and 53%
respectively (Household Income Expenditure Survey, 2002/03).
However, the local communities adjacent to national parks are almost completely
dependent upon subsistence small-stock and crop farming for their livelihoods. This results in the
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human-wildlife conflict since these communities are in wildlife areas. In fact, while the nation at
large benefits from revenue brought through tourism, these communities cannot rear livestock or
even plough their fields freely because of the destruction caused by wild animals. Thus, they retaliate
and pose a threat to the tourism sector. Hence, the Government of Botswana (GoB) put in efforts to
devise mechanisms that could be used to compensate affected communities and thus relieve them
of poverty and vulnerability. As a result, communities get involved through Community Based
Tourism (CBT) which is facilitated by a programme known as Community Based Natural Resources
Management (CBNRM). The CBT is promoted as a “means of development whereby social,
environmental and economic needs of local communities are met through offering a tourism
product” (Goodwin and Santill, 2009, 4).
The evolution of CBNRM is associated with a search for new solutions for the failure of
“top-down” approaches to conservation and development (Rozemeijer & Van der Jagt, 2000).
Basically, CBNRM is premised on the dual recognition that local people must have power to make
decisions relating to natural resources in order to foster sustainable development and that they have
a greater interest in the sustainable use of natural resources around them than either more centralized
or distant government or private management institutions (Mbaiwa, 2005). CBNRM credits local
populations “with having a greater understanding of, as well as vested interest in their local
environment hence they are seen as more able to effectively manage natural resources through local
or traditional practices” (Mbaiwa, 2004, 45). In Botswana, CBNRM was adopted in the 1990s
following the Wildlife Conservation Policy of 1986 and the National Tourism Policy of 1990
(Sebele, 2010). These policies are the pillars of CBNRM and advocate for the involvement of rural
communities in the sustainable utilization of natural resources.
They also advocate for increased opportunities for local communities to benefit from
tourism development. Under the programme, Controlled Hunting Areas (CHAs) are established in
which each area is given a wildlife off-take quota designated by the Department of Wildlife and
National Parks (DWNP). The communities then organise themselves and form a representative
Quota Management Committee or a Community Trust, with the assistance from DWNP to manage
the whole area's quota. The committee decides on how to share the quota among families and has
the option to enter into joint venture agreements with commercial operators or they may opt to
simply auction their hunting quota to safari hunters or companies. The proceeds from the hunting
occurring with the CHA are then used to benefit the community. Some community based tourism
projects such as those by Chobe and Khwai trusts have done well for communities; investing the
proceeds from hunting to build schools and clinics.
However, some have failed and various scholars (Arntzen et al., 2003; Mbaiwa, 2005) have
noted limitations such as irregular benefits due to problems associated with bad relations between
communities and operators. In addition, while the benefits could accrue to the communities at large,
households and/or individuals may not be enjoying the benefits. That is, majority of projects do not
have any defined mechanism for the equitable distribution of benefits accruing from tourism
projects. This points to poor governance of the programme because collective management
structures are often too cumbersome and complex to work effectively (Mitchell and Muckosy,
2008). Moreover, the imposition of democratic and secular institutional forms on communities with
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traditional patterns of authority can also have unintended effects in the sense that even though there
are committees, many a times it is traditional authorities that dictate the critical decisions especially
with respect to financial resources. The lack of transparency, poor coordination and communication
between those in Trust leadership and the rest of the general membership contributes largely to the
failure of CBT projects (Mbaiwa and Darkoh, 2006).
Some of the problems are largely associated with the short duration of contracts governing
committees and operators which acts as a disincentive to community members and results in a
negative attitude towards wildlife conservation (Boggs, 2005). Consequently, this programme has
failed to reach its conservation and long-term sustainable development (SD) goals. Ultimately, the
human-wildlife conflict remains unresolved in the country, posing a threat to the tourism sector.
The less than favourable governance of the CBNRM programme, especially, the uneven
sharing of project benefits if not carefully managed, could become a potential impediment to the
success of community-based tourism in Botswana. Therefore, there is a need to find other ways of
re-directing these benefits to all thus promoting support for nature stewardship and environmental
education efforts as well as enhancing the quality of life of Batswana. The paper proposes that the
governance of the tourism value chain should be inclusive of all affected communities. It should
also strengthen the capacity of communities as well as create participatory mechanisms and avenues
for engaging in conventional policy processes.
It should be noted that not all parts of the country have prime national parks which are as
lucrative as those of the northwest. Nevertheless communities residing in those areas still have to
deal with human-wildlife conflicts. For instance, in the Kgalagadi area there are a lot of lions which
are a threat to livestock and residents. Such areas do not receive high numbers of tourists as those
in the northern part of the country. This translates to tourism revenue generation and benefits being
skewed towards the north-western part of the country. In this way, the CBNRM policy which allows
communities around national parks to benefit from revenues generated from a natural resource
where they reside contradicts the mines and mineral policy, which allows all Batswana to benefit
from mineral revenues regardless of where they reside. The paper therefore proposes a benefit
sharing mechanism. That is, an environmental fund could be established whereby the different
CBNRM trusts contribute proportionately towards the fund. The proceeds so raised will be shared
equally amongst the affected communities residing around national parks.

Conclusion
Botswana’s success is largely anchored on its governance and in turn, usage of natural
resources. First, the paper shows how governance of land and natural resources (non-renewable
resources) assisted it to evade the resource curse; at least so far – suggesting that indeed governance
makes a difference to a country’s development prospects. The country identified land and minerals
as strategic resources whose ownership and control was critical to the country’s development. It is
the prudent usage of these resources that has helped to transform the country from a low to a middle
income status. This is commendable by African standards considering its level of poverty at
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independence in 1966. Despite its success in the non-renewable sector, contradictions remain. Even
then, the non-renewable sector offers lessons for renewable sectors. Secondly, it has shown how the
country can use renewable resources (agriculture and tourism) to realise sustainable development.
As demonstrated with the mineral sector, we contend that governance is equally critical for
renewable resources to realise their full potential. To this extent, other African countries need to
consider and review their governance structures in order to realise sustainable development. The
paper concludes as follows, with respect to renewable resources in Botswana: with regard to
agriculture it proposes the establishment of a national meat council to oversee the governance of the
beef value chain. It also proposes the establishment of a benefit sharing mechanism in the tourism
sector. That is, an environmental fund from which the different CBNRM trusts could contribute
proportiately towards. This would allow the proceeds from the fund to be shared equitably by those
residing around national parks. While this appears contradictory to what is happening in the nonrenewable (mineral) sector, we argue that communities residing around national parks should
benefit from the environmental fund because they are the ones dealing with the day to day challenges
arising out of human-wildlife conflicts, unlike those residing elsewhere.
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